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PRODUCTION EFFECTS OF AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL “GREEN 




Agri-environmental programs are part of the green box of the GATT Uruguay Round and are 
supposed to “have no, or at most minimal trade distorting effects or effects on production.” In 
addition, “the amount of payment shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in 
complying with the government programme.” Utilizing farm accounting data we estimate the effects 
on yields for ten agri-environmental programs in Austria, which account for 12% of EU’s budget 
expenditures for agri-environmental programs. Only three out of these ten programs have significant 
negative effects on yields, while one program has a significant positive impact and the rest has no 
significant impact. These results suggest that there are serious windfall profits associated with some of 
these programs. 
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De-coupling 
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1. Introduction 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994 was the first significant accord 
towards a more liberalized world trade in agricultural products. The cornerstones of the URAA are: i) 
market access including tariffication of non-tariff border measures and the subsequent reduction of 
these tariffs as well as a minimum percentage of imports; ii) export competition including a reduction 
in the volume of export subsidies and in the quantity of subsidized exports; and iii) a reduction in 
domestic support, as measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) (Moyer and Josling, 
2002, chapter 7).  
One of the reasons for the limited progress on liberalizing agricultural trade in the seven rounds 
before the URAA is the importance of domestic policy goals of agricultural policy, including self-
sufficiency, “fair” farm income, food security, food quality, rural development, and environmental 
issues (Blandford and Boisvert, 2002). In the URRA these so-called nontrade concerns
2 were 
addressed in the “green box”.
3 Green box measures are not included in the AMS and therefore 
exempted from reductions. They must meet the following general criteria: (i) “that they have no, or at 
most minimal, trade distorting effects or effects on production”; (ii) that “the support in question shall 
                                                           
1 The authors wish to express their gratitude towards Martin Hellwagner (LBG 
Buchführungsgesellschaft), Otto Hofer (Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and 
Water Management) and Agrarmarkt Austria (AMA) for their cooperation. We are grateful to 
Christoph Weiß and seminar participants at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel and the Martin-
Luther-Universität Halle for valuable comments. Senior authorship is not assigned. 
2 It has been argued that these nontrade concerns including EU’s reference to the multifunctional role 
of farming are just a re-airing of the so-called non-economic objectives as discussed in the 1980s 
(e.g. in Winters,1989) at an early stage of the GATT-Uruguay Round (Anderson, 2000; Potter and 
Burney, 2002).  
3  The Preamble of the URAA includes an explicit reference to these nontrade concerns; “… 
commitments under the reform programme should be made in an equitable way among all Members, 
having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the 
environment.”   3
be provided through a publicly funded government programme (including government revenue 
forgone) not involving transfers from consumer”; and (iii) that “the support in question shall not have 
the effect of providing price support to consumers” (Annex 2 of the Agreement of Agriculture, signed 
in Marrakech). Therefore, green box measures are supposed to be fully decoupled payments or what is 
called a lump-sum transfer.  
Although including a multitude of different support measures (e.g. general services like research 
and extension, domestic food aid, disaster aid)
4 the most prominent and most frequently discussed 
category of green box payments are agri-environmental programs. In addition, since agriculture is still 
an important source of environmental degradation (Bromley, 1996, Claassen, 2001) including 
problems like soil erosion, groundwater contamination, green house gas emission and loss of 
biodiversity, environmental concerns seem to serve as the perfect example of a legitimate domestic 
policy objective that might conflict with liberalizing trade. Environmental concerns are also in the 
center of EU’s claim for the multifunctional role of agriculture.  
To be accepted as a green box measure agri-environmental programs have to fulfill two 
additional criteria: (iv) “Eligibility for such payments shall be determined as part of a clearly-defined 
government environmental or conservation programme and be dependent on the fulfillment of specific 
conditions under the government programme, including conditions related to production methods or 
inputs” and (v) “the amount of payment shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved 
in complying with the government programme” (Annex 2 of the Agreement of Agriculture, signed in 
Marrakech).  
Given this background on agri-environmental policies within the WTO the study at hand 
examines the production effects of agri-environmental programs in the EU. In particular, we look at 
the effects on grain yields of ten agri-environmental schemes in Austria. These ten schemes accounted 
for approximately 12% of EU’s expenditures for agri-environmental programs. In addition, in their 
focus to decrease negative externalities from agricultural production by putting some restrictions on 
the use of inputs (e.g. on easily soluble commercial fertilizers or pesticides) or requirements on 
management (codex of good farming practices, organic farming) they are typical for many other agri-
environmental programs in the EU, but also in other countries. For example, Diakosavvas (2003) 
remarks that 68% of agri-environmental programs in the EU are classified in the OECD’s Producer 
Support Measure (PSE) calculations as ‘payments based on input constraints.’ 
In quantifying the production effects of these agri-environmental programs we contribute to 
evaluate if these programs are in line with the criteria of the URRA, in particular to criteria (i), (iv) 
and (v). The production effect of an agri-environmental program depends crucially on two things. The 
first is related to criteria (iv) and the question of what specific conditions related to production 
methods or inputs have to be fulfilled and to what extend these conditions actually constraint 
production. Since participation in these programs is voluntary, it has been argued that there is a self-
selection bias and farmers receive payments although they do not have to change (or only to a minimal 
extend) their framing practices (Ahrens et al.). Hence, there would be windfall gains what is not in line 
with criteria (v). Given that the cost of participation are not equal for all farmers (because of 
differences in natural and economic conditions), but compensations for participation are usually 
payments per hectare, windfall gains seem to be inevitable.  
The second determinant of the production effect of agri-environmental programs is the extent to 
which these green payments are decoupled. It has been argued that it is very unlikely that payments 
that increase income, although not directly connected to production, are actually a lump-sum transfer 
with no effect on production (Blandford, 2001). Especially, developing countries have contended that 
developed countries just shifted their farm income support from the amber to the green box (Devadoss, 
2002; OECD, 2001a; Neary, 2004). Gohin et al. (2003) and OECD (2001b) discuss theoretically how 
decoupled direct payments still influence production by having an effect on the decision to stop 
farming (cross-subsidization), on labor allocation, on investment decisions, and on risk perception. 
That subsidies are not production neutral is also confirmed by a survey of 459 part-time farmers in 
eight EU countries which reveals that 85% of all agricultural direct payments are either reinvested or 
used for operating inputs in the farm holding (Bergström et al. 1998).  
                                                           
4 See Yumin, Hongxia and Mayu (2004) for details.   4
However, to date not much empirical work exists on the production effects of agri-environmental 
programs. Diakosavvas (2003) is doing an ex-post analysis based on observed data. On a more 
aggregated level with cross-section data of OECD countries Diakosavvas utilizes a meta production 
function approach and a trade flow equation to measure to what extent agri-environmental policies are 
production and trade neutral. He finds environmental payments to be small but statistical significant 
positive determinant of agricultural production and trade. Cooper at al. (2003) conduct an ex-ante 
analysis for three hypothetical schemes concerned with soil conservation or erosion reduction in the 
US. They derive effects on exports ranging from -7% to +1%.  
The reminder of this study is organized as follows: The next section describes the ten agri-
environmental programs in Austria to be analyzed. Section 3 discusses how we use farm accounting 
data to estimate the production effects of agri-environmental programs. Section 4 represents 
estimation results and some simulation of the total effect of all ten programss. Section 5 discusses 
these results.  
 
2. Austrian Agri-environmental programme 
The Austrian Agri-environmental Programme OePUL (Austrian programme for the promotion of 
extensive farming methods compatible with requirements of environmental protection and the 
maintenance of the countryside) was introduced in 1995, the year after EU-accession consisting of 25 
individual schemes (Groier and Loibl, 2000). Here we concentrate our analysis on the ten schemes 
relevant for grain production: 
 
1.)   Elementary support: compliance with the code of good fertilising practice; livestock density 
restricted to 2.5 animal units per hectare 
2.)  Organic farming: in accordance with EU Regulation 2092/91 on organic farming; live-stock 
density restricted to 2.5 animal units per hectare 
3.)  Non-application of agro-chemicals, whole farm: identical to organic farming in regard to crop 
production but not animal production; livestock density restricted to 2.5 animal units per hectare 
4.)  Crop rotation scheme: a maximum of 75% of arable land may be cultivated with grains and 
maize; a winter cover crop covering at least 15% of arable land must be planted; direct payments 
increase with the share of arable land covered by winter crops 
5.)  Extensive grain (wheat, barley, oats, rye) production: grain cultivation limited to low-yield 
varieties; non-application of growth regulators or fungicides; crop specific limits of N-fertiliser 
application; non-application of sewage sludge; maintaining of the grassland area 
6.)  Non-application of growth regulators 
7.)  Non-application of easily soluble mineral fertilisers and growth regulators 
8.)  Non-application of easily soluble mineral fertilisers and synthetic chemical crop protection 
agents 
9.)  Non-application of fungicides 
10.) Non-application of synthetic chemical crop protection agents 
 
The first four schemes require the farm to participate with the whole area, while the rest allows 
for partial participation (e.g., that only 15% of a farm’s tilled acreage are managed according to a 
scheme’s regulations). Since Organic farming and non-application of agro-chemicals at the whole 
farm have basically the same requirements for crop production we will put them in the same category 
in the empirical analysis. 
In 1997 these ten schemes accounted for about 68% of total expenditures for agri-environmental 
programmes in Austria (Groier and Hofer, 2002). In the same year about 21% of total EU budget for 
agri-environmental programmes was transferred to Austria. Hence, these ten schemes accounted for 
about 12% of all EU’s expenditures for agri-environmental programmes.  
The considered schemes are quite typical for agri-environmental programs. According to 
Diakosavvas (2003) 68% of all agri-environmental programs in the EU and more than 60% in the 
OECD are measures restricting the use of specific inputs. 
 
3. Data and Method   5
To estimate the production effects of these ten schemes farm accounting data linked with the official 
agricultural support data (INVEKOS) for a sample of 1327 Austrian farms was available. We had two 
years of observation before the introduction of these agri-environmental programs (1993, 1994) and 
two years with these programs in place (1997, 1998). In estimating the production effects we face two 
main problems: i) farmers can participate in more than one programme at the same time (Table 1) and 
ii) that participation rates were highly unequal between schemes (Table 2).  
 
Table 1: Distribution of farmers in the sample regarding to the number of participations in agri-
environmental schemes  
participation in  Number of farms 
no scheme  45 
1 scheme  50 
2 schemes  199 
3 schemes  629 
4 schemes  431 
5 schemes  31 
6 schemes  1 
 
 
Table 2: Number and percentage of participants for a sample of 1327 bookkeeping farms 
scheme absolute  % 
Elementary support  1244  93.7   
Organic farming  154  11.6 
Non-application agro-chemicals, whole farm  33  2.5 
Crop rotation scheme  1141  86.0 
Extensive grain production  511  38.5 
Non-application growth regulators  823  62.0 
Non- appl. chemical fertilisers & growth regulators  35  2.6 
Non- appl. chem. fertilisers & synth. crop prot. agents  24  1.8 
Non-application fungicides  83  6.3 
Non-application synthetic crop protection agents  12  0.9 
 
In order to be able to compare yields of different kinds of grain (wheat, rye, oats, barley) we 
construct an index of relative yields. In addition, this formulation enables a nice interpretation of the 
regression results later on and makes it unnecessary to account for technical progress over time. The 
relative yield of farm i for grain j (
j












i V  is the absolute yield of farm i for grain j and 
j V  is the average yield for grain j over all n 
farms. The relative yield of farm i over all j grains (vi) is given by 


















i F  is the area farm i allocates to grain j. Hence, vi is the weighted average of the relative yields 
of all grains.  
Since participation in agri-environmental programs is voluntary there is obviously a self-selection 
bias problem. Therefore, it is important to account for the different natural and economic conditions of 
the farms. It is helpful to have information about the farms even before the introduction of the agri-
environmental program and we utilize this information in two different econometric models: i) fixed-
effects, and ii) difference-in-difference.  
In the fixed-effects approach relative yields of farm i in the year t (vi,t) are explained by a vector 
X of natural (soil, climate, weather, …) and economic factors (farm size, specialisation, management, 
…), other unobserved farm specific factors αi and a dummy vector D of program participation.  
 
t i t i v , , ε γ + + + = i,t i i,t i i D X β α          ( 3 )      
 
where εi is a random error term. For schemes including the whole farm Di,t is set to 1 if a farm 
participated in a specific year and 0 for non-participation. For schemes including only specific crop 
areas Di,t is set to the ratio between participating and total crop area. A parameter value of γ1 = -0.07 
would imply a 7% lower yield for participation on average.  
In the difference-in-differences approach we compare the situation before the introduction of the 
agri-environmental program (an average of 1993 and 1994) to the situation afterwards (an average of 
1997 and 1998): 
 
( ) t i i i i v v , 94 / 1993 98 / 1997 94 / 1993 , 98 / 1997 , ) ( ' ε α + + + − + = − i i,t i i, i, i R δ D γ X X β    (4) 
 
where α is a constant. In addition to the observed farm specific factors Xi, and the participation 
dummies Di, we include a vector of dummies Ri for the production area in which the farm is located 
(Since this doesn’t vary over time we can not include these dummies in the fixed-effects model.) 
Again a parameter value of γ1 = -0.07 can be interpreted as a 7% lower yield for participation.  
 
4. Results 
To describe the different economic and natural conditions of farmers as represented by vector X we 
use  
AREA: tilled  area 
RATIO:  the ratio of tilled to total farm area  
UVH:  unit value per hectare: this is a variable compiled for tax purposes including soil 
characteristics, climate etc. 
AUH:  animal-units per hectare 
In the fixed effects model the expected sign of the coefficient of AREA is positive, since relative 
yields are expected to increase with farms size. This variable accounts for economies of scale. The 
same positive sign is expected for RATIO (yields improve with specialisation) and UVH (yields   7
improve with better soil and climatically conditions). If the yields will improve with an increasing 
AUH is not completely clear. On the one side farms with more animal units per hectare might be those 
specializing in animal production not crop production. On the other side more AUH implies more 
manure. In the case of the difference-in-difference model positive and negative signs for the 
differences in AREA, RATIO, UVH and AUH are possible. Vector Ri consists of dummies for 89 
different production regions (Kleinproduktionsgebiete) in Austria as defined in Schwackhöfer (1996) 
and Wagner (1990a, 1990b). 
 
Table 3: Results of fixed-effects model 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.153 0.025  6.173  0.000
Elementary support  0.012 0.015  0.808  0.419
Organ. farm. & non-appl. agro-chem., whole farm  -0.076 0.017  -4.533  0.000
Crop rotation scheme  0.022 0.013  1.674  0.094
Extensive grain production  -0.079 0.017  -4.727  0.000
Non-application growth regulators  0.004 0.014  0.300  0.764
Non- appl. chemical fertilisers & growth regulators  -0.031 0.043  -0.721  0.471
Non- appl. chem. fertilisers & synth. crop prot. agents  0.062 0.085  0.730  0.466
Non-application fungicides  -0.017 0.054  -0.314  0.754
Non-application synthetic crop protection agents  -0.089 0.103  -0.862  0.389
AREA -0.001 0.001  -1.659  0.097
RATIO 0.100 0.047  2.160  0.031
UVH 0.633 0.032  19.658  0.000
AUH 0.083 0.014  5.920  0.000
Adjusted R-squared  0.685    
 
  Results of the fixed-effects are illustrated in Table 3. Since Organic farming and non-
application of agro-chemicals at the whole farm have basically the same requirements for crop 
production we put them in the same category. The explanatory variables RATIO, UVH and AUH 
are significant at least at the 5% level. The variable AREA is significant at the 10% level, but 
has the wrong sign. RATIO, UVH. Only three of the ten participation dummies are significant 
at least at the 10% level: organic faming and application of agr-chemicals at the whole farm, 
crop rotation, and extensive grain production. On average, participation in organic farming 
decreases yields by about 7.6%. Participating in the crop rotation program has a positive 
effect on yields of 2.2% and extensive grain production decreases yields by 7.9 percent. The 
R
2 is satisfactory with 0.69. 
  Results of the difference-in-difference models are illustrated in Table 4 and 5. Since 
there ares some farms who participate in programs in 1998, but not 1997 we compare the 
average of 1993 and 1994 either to 1997 (Table 4) or to 1998 (Table 5). The results in Table 5 
are not very different from the results of the fixed-effects model. The same three programs 
have a significant impact on yields in at a comparable level. If we compare the average of 
1993 and 1994 to 1997 (Table 4) only organic farming has a significant impact. However, 
1997 was an abnormal year with quite high average yields and a much lower variance. With 
0.22 and 0.21 the R
2s are satisfactory for a difference-in-difference estimation. The regional 
dummies are highly significant as revealed by an F-test. 
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Table 4: Results of difference-in difference model, average 1993 and 1994 to 1997 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant -0.003 0.057  -0.058  0.954
Elementary support  0.031 0.023  1.307  0.191
Organ. farm. & non-appl. agro-chem., whole farm  -0.072 0.022  -3.339  0.001
Crop rotation scheme  0.022 0.017  1.302  0.193
Extensive grain production  -0.037 0.026  -1.395  0.163
Non-application growth regulators  -0.019 0.017  -1.113  0.266
Non- appl. chemical fertilisers & growth regulators  -0.061 0.051  -1.190  0.234
Non- appl. chem. fertilisers & synth. crop prot. agents  -0.083 0.113  -0.734  0.463
Non-application fungicides  -0.061 0.064  -0.962  0.336
Non-application synthetic crop protection agents  -0.081 0.115  -0.698  0.485
AREA -0.001 0.001  -1.270  0.204
RATIO -0.082 0.078  -1.059  0.290
UVH -0.081 0.131  -0.620  0.536
AUH 0.061 0.022  2.776  0.006
Adjusted R-squared  0.220    
 
Table 5: Results of difference-in difference model, average 1993 and 1994 to 1999 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant -0.166 0.058  -2.833  0.005
Elementary support  0.006 0.024  0.254  0.800
Organ. farm. & non-appl. agro-chem., whole farm  -0.066 0.022  -3.000  0.003
Crop rotation scheme  0.032 0.017  1.846  0.065
Extensive grain production  -0.052 0.026  -2.029  0.043
Non-application growth regulators  -0.018 0.018  -0.997  0.319
Non- appl. chemical fertilisers & growth regulators  -0.052 0.052  -1.005  0.315
Non- appl. chem. fertilisers & synth. crop prot. agents  0.047 0.106  0.442  0.659
Non-application fungicides  -0.060 0.065  -0.924  0.356
Non-application synthetic crop protection agents  -0.080 0.117  -0.683  0.495
AREA -0.002 0.001  -2.588  0.010
RATIO -0.208 0.073  -2.863  0.004
UVH -0.134 0.113  -1.187  0.235
AUH 0.039 0.019  1.996  0.046
Regional Dummies      0.000
Adjusted R-squared  0.210    
 
Since farmer can participate in more than one program and almost all participate in the two big 
programs elementary support and crop rotation, one can see all ten programs as a package and ask for 
the overall effect of these ten programs. To answer this question we conduct some simulation 
experiment. Starting from the coefficients and standard deviations estimated in the regression analysis 
we randomly draw one value out of the underlying normal distribution for each coefficient and weight 
it with the percentage of farmers of the sample participating in each program. Adding up the results for 
all ten programs gives the overall effect of all ten programs. Repeating this procedure 10,000 times 
gives a mean effect as well as a standard deviation. The results of this simulation exercise for all three 
underlying regression models are illustrated in Table 6. The overall effect is estimated to be close to 
zero (between -1.1% and 0.2%) on average. However, given the uncertainty of the regression 
estimates of some program effects (high standard deviations of participation dummies) the possible 
overall impact has also a quite high standard deviation. In 50% of the simulated cases the overall 
effect is between -13% and +11% based on the fixed-effects model. 
   9






Elementary support  0.012  0.028  0.007 
Organ. farm. & non-appl. agro-chem., whole farm  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010 
Crop rotation scheme  0.019  0.018  0.027 
Extensive grain production  -0.030  -0.014  -0.020 
Non-application growth regulators  0.003  -0.011  -0.010 
Non- appl. chemical fertilisers & growth regulators  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
Non- appl. chem. fertilisers & synth. crop prot. agents  0.001  -0.002  0.001 
Non-application fungicides  -0.001  -0.004  -0.004 
Non-application synthetic crop protection agents  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
Sum -0.008  0.002  -0.011 
Standard deviation  0.176  0.211  0.212 
50% Intervall lower  -0.126  -0.141  -0.155 




On 1 August 2004 in Geneva the 147 members of the WTO agreed on a framework for 
modalities to liberalize farm trade. An important result is that though domestic support will further be 
reduced green-box payments will remain untouched. Agri-environmental programs are on group of 
policies under the Green box and have to fulfill several criteria including (i) “that they have no, or at 
most minimal, trade distorting effects or effects on production”, that (iv) “Eligibility for such 
payments shall be determined as part of a clearly-defined government environmental or conservation 
programme and be dependent on the fulfillment of specific conditions under the government 
programme, including conditions related to production methods or inputs” and that (v) “the amount of 
payment shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying with the 
government programme” (Annex 2 of the Agreement of Agriculture, signed in Marrakech). This study 
empirically measures the production effects of ten agri-environmental programs in Austria. These ten 
programs account for 12% of EU expenditures for agri-environmental programs. In addition these 
programs are typical for the largest class of EU agri-environmental programs, those trying to reduce 
negative externalities of production by limiting some of environmental harmful inputs. Participation is 
voluntary and farmers are compensated by fixed area payments.  
Our estimates can confirm negative effects of program participation on yields for three out of 
the ten programs: one is organic farming, a second is equal to organic farming in regard to crop 
production only, and the last one is extensive grain cultivation (including a limitation to low-yield 
varieties; non-application of growth regulators or fungicides; crop specific limits of N-fertiliser 
application; non-application of sewage sludge; maintaining of the grassland area). One program (crop 
rotation) has a significant positive effect on production, and one program (elementary support) has a 
positive, but insignificant effect. For all other programs participation has a negative effect which is 
also not significant. Given this, and some simulation on the overall effect of all ten programs, it seems 
that these programs are more or less in line with criteria (i) of the URAA “that they have no, or at most 
minimal, trade distorting effects or effects on production”. However, since most programs have no 
significant negative effect on yields and one program has even a positive effect, it seems that there is a 
serious self-selection bias (i.e. farmers participate only in those programs where they don’t have to 
change their behavior) creating serious windfall profits. This seems to be not in line with criteria (v) 
“the amount of payment shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying 
with the government programme.” To avoid this windfall profits, payments have to be linked to the 
cost of participation what is not the case for most programs to date. In the long run the approval of   10
these payments in trade negotiations as well as by society in general will crucially depend on the 
extent these programmes actually internalise externalities rather than creating rents to farmers.    11
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